theonomic hermeneutics

Here is Bahnsen (No Other Standard - Appendix B: Poythress as a Theonomist) on Poythress (The Shadow of Christ in the Law of Moses) on theonomy and specifically hermeneutical method.

Poythress agrees with theonomists that “all the commandments of the law are binding on Christians,” and he then adds that “the way” in which they are binding is determined by Christ’s authority and “the fulfillment that takes place in His work”; “the way in which each law is fulfilled in Christ determines the way in which it is to be observed now” (pp. 268, 269). He writes that “Christ’s work defines the true nature of continuity and discontinuity between Old and New Testament situations” (p. 286). These are true enough, as formal statements. The question now becomes how this fulfillment is to be defined by the faithful student of Scripture – by the text of Scripture interpreting redemption for us, or by the theologian’s creative and abstract notions of what the age of redemption means?

The dispute between Poythress and theonomy, it seems to me, is over the way in which the discontinuities with the Old Testament law are to be identified in the Bible. We would have to say that Poythress’ general hermeneutical style is not adequately controlled by the text of Scripture. As we saw above, he gives too much room to playful imagination and loose, ambiguous, thematic connections for there to be any confidence in his conclusions. His reasoning has little protection from unreliability and arbitrariness. You can prove just about anything by means of it. Thus it is theologically unacceptable. To use Poythress’ own words: “If we do not pay careful, detailed attention to explicit texts, we may be filling ourselves merely with our own ideas” (p.350).

It is much safer and Biblically sound to presume continuity with Old Testament moral demands (Deut. 4:2; Matt. 5:17-19) – as properly understood through exegesis of their own original text and context — and then allow specific, relevant texts in the rest of Scripture to amplify or transform or even put aside those requirements, given the inauguration of the radically new age of salvation brought by Christ (e.g., the paradigm of Acts 10). This does not exclude the use of topological interpretation, nor does it prevent reasoning by analogy (regarding classes of laws). It simply demands that the premises of such arguments be justiilable on the basis of textual exegesis.

The danger in having only as yet read this appendix from Bahnsen is that presently I'm in the dark about how/if Bahnsen is going to distinguish between moral and ceremonial / ritual laws. Even if as Leithart states this classification is 'legally unworkable and practically awkward', assuming we are able to draw some distinction between here, would the same principle outlined in the final paragraph of the Bahnsen quote hold also for ceremonial law?