Preterism and typology

David Field has some helpful comments on preterism here. I really would like to thank him for the help he has been to me, and I'm sure others, on thinking through this issue over the last couple of months. I'm certain he has helped me to read the Scriptures in a more faithful way.

However I wouldn't be as certain that a preteristic reading allows us to affirm point a) "we do not necessarily think that everything is going to get worse before Jesus comes back (the verses which look like 'getting worse and worse' aren't about that)."

Typologically why the Noanic flood judgment that Peter refers to 2 Peter 3:5-8 should be typological of the AD 70 end of a world judgment and not of the judgment at Jesus second advent makes no sense. If we can say that we should actually expect to see similar nonsense in our day as in the pre-flood days because the characteristics of the ungodly are the same in any age, then why should we not also expect to see the same state of affairs existing just prior to Jesus' return as existed both immediately preceding the flood and the AD 70 end of world judgments - affairs which include the righteous minority being oppressed unrighteous majority.

Surely in this way, those passages which Preterism rightly identifies as having the AD 70 end of world judgment as their referent, are typologically informative for the end of world judgment at Jesus' return. Given the unity in which God works out his purposes that underlies a typological reading of Scripture, one would therefore expect on the basis of the flood, the Exile, Jesus' cross and resurrection and AD 70 that the final judgment anti-typical judgment would echo these judgments in this way.

Baptism and sacred lineage

Acknowledging that baptism takes the place of circumcision, need not of necessity demand that the covenant sign be administered to the children of believers now. At least one aspect of circumcision, for which it was an eminently fitting sign, was that it functioned as the sign of the sacred lineage of Israel which ended with Christ the promised seed. It would appear that this aspect of the sign has now lost it's significance. While both the New Testament church and Old Testament Israel are God's people, it must be acknowledged that pre first-advent Israel alone had the role of ensuring that blessing would come by way of decent through Abraham's physical seed (Gal.3:16). This is not to deny the continuity that clearly exists between Old Testament Israel and the church but to seek to take account of the biblically framed distinctives.

Barth speaks of the redemptive-historical change which he understands has come about in the relation between parents and children. In the Old Covenant, marriage and propagation were determined by their place in the history of redemption: before Christ came there was "a redemptive-historical necessity of propagation." But after Christ came this necessity ceased to exist because the sacred lineage had found its fulfillment and hence also its termination. Thus he suggests, "it could have continued, but it did not have to."

Since Christ's first advent, salvation is no longer of necessity bound to the succession of generations. "It was," says Barth, "now a matter of man being God's child in his spiritual communion with the one Son of God and Men. Of God's children it can henceforth be said with Jn. 1:13 that they do not receive life by means of the will of man, but of God."

Critiquing Barth, Berkouwer notes that it is the contrast which he assumes between natural and spiritual birth that leads him astray. He states, "to contrast spiritual birth since the coming of Messiah with natural birth in the lineage of Israel, is to misunderstand the spiritual significance of God's covenant and of circumcision. ... it was never the case in the Old Testament that natural birth, apart from faith, placed a person automatically amongst the people of God."

But Berkouwer's criticism fails precisely on the point of Barth's distinctive. One can acknowledge with Berkouwer that the prophets demanded faith under the Old Covenant and that those adults lacking such and demonstrating open rebellion against the covenant would have come rightly under it's sanctions. Yet it is obvious that it certainly was the case that "natural birth, apart from faith, placed a person automatically amongst the people of God," for it was impossible to be born into Israel and not become a member of God's people, and that in order that the sacred lineage might continue until the promised seed arrived.

Paedobaptists often seem so keen to affirm the spiritual nature of the Covenant with Abraham, which Romans 4 clearly says was one of faith, that when Credobaptists state that there are also natural or physical elements inherent to that Covenant then they are heard as saying the Old Covenant was only merely external. It seems to me that Israel's distinctive role in redemption history as those through whose lineage the Messiah must come, demonstrates that Abraham's children are those of faith (Rom. 4:12) and hence the covenant has a truly spiritual aspect, but also during the time prior to Christ's advent, his physical decedents, some of whom will share in his faith, whilst others evidence that they do not.

Hodge: nature of the church III - 2 Abrahamic covenants

It is to be remembered that there were two covenants made with Abraham. By the one, his natural descendants through Isaac were constituted a commonwealth, an external, visible community. By the other, his spiritual descendants were constituted a Church. The parties to the former covenant were God and the natiofi; to the other, God and his true people. The promises of the national covenant were national blessings; the promises of the spiritual covenant, (i.e. of the covenant of grace,) were spiritual blessings, reconciliation, holiness, and eternal life. The conditions of the one covenant were circumcision and obedience to the law; the condition of the latter was, is, and ever has been, faith in the Messiah as the seed of the woman, the Son of God, and the Saviour of the world. There cannot be a greater mistake than to confound the national covenant with the covenant of grace, and the commonwealth founded on the one with the Church founded on the other.

When Christ came "the commonwealth" was abolished, and there was nothing put in its place. The Church remained. There was no external covenant, nor promises of external blessings, on condition of external rites and subjection. There was a spiritual society with spiritual promises, on the condition of faith in Christ. In no part of the New Testament is any other condition of membership in the Church prescribed than that contained in the answer of Philip to the eunuch who desired baptism: "If thou believest with all thine heart, thou mayest. And he answered and said, I believe that Jesus Christ is the Son of God."-Acts viii. 37. The Church, therefore, is, in its essential nature, a company of believers, and not an external society, requiring merely external profession as the condition of membership. While this is true and vitally important, it is no less true that believers make themselves visible by the profession of the truth, by holiness of life, by separation from the world as a peculiar people, and by organizing themselves for the worship of Christ, and for mutual watch and care. The question, when any such organization is to be regarded as a portion of the true Church, is one to which the Protestant answer has already been given in a few words, but its fuller discussion must be reserved to some other occasion. (Princeton Review, October 1853).

Hodge: nature of church II - objections answered

1. The objections which the Romish and Ritual class, urge against this doctrine, are either founded on misconception, or resolve themselves into objections against the scriptural view of the nature of the Church as "the company of believers." Thus, in the first place, it is objected that in the Scriptures and in all ecclesiastical history, the Church is spoken of and addressed as a visible society of professing Christians. The churches of Jerusalem, Antioch, Corinth, and Rome, were all such societies; and the whole body of such professors constituted THE CHURCH. History traces the origin, the extension, the trials, and the triumphs of that outward community. It is vain, therefore, to deny that body to be the Church, which the Bible and all Christendom unite in so designating. But was not the ancient Hebrew commonwealth called Israel, Jerusalem, Zion? Is not its history, as a visible society, recorded from Abraham to the destruction of Jerusalem? And yet does not Paul say expressly, that he is not a Jew who is one outwardly; that the external Israel is not the true Israel? In this objection the real point at issue is overlooked. The question is not, whether a man who professes to be a Christian, may properly be so addressed and so treated, but whether profession makes a man a true Christian. The question is not, whether a society of professing Christians may properly be called a Church, and be so regarded, but whether their being such a society constitutes them a competent part of the body of Christ. The whole question is, What is the subject of the attributes and prerogatives of the body of Christ? Is it the external body of professors, or the company of believers? If calling a man a Christian does not imply that he has the character and the inheritance of the disciples of Christ; if calling the Jewish commonwealth Israel did not imply that they were the true Israel, then calling the professors of the true religion the Church, does not imply that they are the body of Christ. When the designation given to any man or body of men, involves nothing more than what they are called.

To address any one as emperor, king, or president, is to admit his claim to such title. But when the designation is expressive of some inward quality, and a state of mind, its application does not imply its actual possession, but simply that it is claimed. To call men saints, believers, the children of God, or a Church, supposes them to be true believers, or the true Church, only on the assumption that "no internal virtue" is necessary to union with the Church, or to make a man a believer and a child of God.at is external or official, its application implies they are what they are called.

That doctrine admits the propriety of calling any man a Christian who professes to be a worshipper of Christ, and of designating any company of such men a church. It only denies that he is a real Christian who is one only in name; or that that is a true Church, which is such only in profession.

2. It is objected that the possession of officers, of laws, of terms of communion, necessarily supposes the Church to have the visibility of an external society. How can a man be received into the Church, or excommunicated from it, if the Church is not an outward organization? Did the fact that the Hebrews had officers and laws, a temple, a ritual, terms of admission and exclusion, make the external Israel the true Israel, or prove that the visibility of the latter was that of a state or commonwealth? Protestants admit that true believers form themselves into a visible society, with officers, laws, and terms of communion-but they deny that such society is the true Church, any further than it consists of true believers. Everything comes back to the question, What is the Church? True believers constitute the true Church; professed believers constitute the outward Church. These two things are not to be confounded. The external body is not, as such, the body of Christ.

The true Israel was not the commonwealth, as such, and the outward organization, with its laws and officers, though intimately related with the spiritual body as the true Church, did not constitute it. The question, how far the outward Church is the true Church, is easily answered. Just so far as it is what it professes to be, and no further. So far as it is a company of faithful men, animated and controlled by the Holy Spirit, it is a true Church, a constituent member of the body of Christ. If it be asked further, how we are to know whether a given society is to be regarded as a Church; we answer, precisely as we know whether a given individual is to be regarded as a Christian, i. e. by their profession and conduct.

Bossuet presents this objection in the light of a contradiction. He says, "Protestants insist that the Church consists exclusively of believers, and is therefore an invisible body. But when asked for the signs of a Church, they say, the word and sacraments: thus making it an external society with ordinances, a ministry, and public service. If so, how can it consist exclusively of the pious? And where was there any such society, answering to the Protestant definition, before the Reformation?"* This objection rests upon the misconception which Ritualists do not appear able to rid themselves of. When Protestants say the Church is invisible, they only mean that an inward and consequently invisible state of mind is the condition of membership, and not that those who have this internal qualification are invisible, or that they cannot be so known as to enable us to discharge the duties which we owe them. When asked, what makes a man a Christian? we say, true faith. When asked, whom must we regard and treat as Christians? we answer, those who make a credible profession of their faith. Is there any contradiction in this? Is there any force in the objection, that if faith is an inward quality, it cannot be proved by outward evidence? Thus, when Protestants are asked, what is the true Church? they answer, the company of believers. When asked, what associations are to be regarded and treated as churches? they answer, those in which the gospel is preached.

3. A third objection is very much of the same kind as the preceding. If the Church consists exclusively of believers, it is invisible. We are, however, required to obey the Church, to hear the Church, &c. But how can we hear and obey an invisible body? To this the answer is, the Church is no more invisible than believers are. We are commanded to love the brethren; to do good to all men, especially to the household of faith. As faith, however, is invisible, it may be asked, in the spirit of this objection, how can we tell who are believers? Christ says, by their fruits.

4. Much the most plausible argument of Romanists is derived from the analogy of the old dispensation. That the Church is a visible society, consisting of the professors of the true religion, as distinguished from the body of true believers, known only to God, is plain, they say, because under the old dispensation it was such a society, embracing all the descendants of Abraham who professed the true religion, and received the sign of circumcision. To this external society were given the oracles of God, the covenants, the promises, the means of grace. Out of its pale there was no salvation. Union with it was the necessary condition of acceptance with God. This was a divine institution. It was a visible Church, consisting of professors, and not exclusively of believers. If such a society existed then by divine appointment, what has become of it? Has it ceased to exist? Has removing its restriction to one people destroyed its nature? Does lopping certain branches from the tree destroy the tree itself? Far from it. The Church exists as an external society now as it did then; what once belonged to the commonwealth of Israel, now belongs to the visible Church. As union with the commonwealth of Israel was necessary to salvation then, so union with the visible Church is necessary to salvation now. And as subjection to the priesthood, and especially to the high-priest, was necessary to union with Israel then, so submission to the regular ministry, and especially to the Pope, is necessary to union with the Church now. Such is the favourite argument of Romanists; and such, (striking out illogically the last clause, which requires subjection to prelates, or the Pope,) we are sorry to say is the argument of some Protestants, and even of some Presbyterians.

The fallacy of this whole argument lies in the false assumption, that the external Israel was the true Church. It was not the body of Christ; it was not pervaded by his Spirit. Membership in it did not constitute membership in the body of Christ. The rejection or destruction of the external Israel was not the destruction of the Church. The apostacy of the former was not the apostacy of the latter. The attributes, promises, and prerogatives of the one, were not those of the other. In short, they were not the same, and, therefore, that the visibility of the one was that of an external organization, is no proof that the visibility of the Church is that of an external society. All this is included, not only in the express declaration of the Apostle, that the external Israel was not the true Israel, but is involved in his whole argument. It was, indeed, the main point of discussion between himself and theJews. The great question was, is a man made a member of the true Israel, and a partaker of the promise, by circumcision and subjection, or by faith in Christ? If the former, then the Jews were right, and Paul was wrong as to the whole issue. But if the latter, then Paul was right and the Jews wrong. And this is the precise question between us and Romanists, and Anglicans. If the external Israel was the true Israel, then Romanists are right and Protestants are wrong as to the method of salvation.

Besides, if we admit that the external Israel was the true Church, then we must admit that the true Church apostatized; for it is undeniable that the whole external Israel, as an organized body, did repeatedly, and for long periods, lapse into idolatry. Nay more, we must admit that the true Church rejected and crucified Christ; for he was rejected by the external Israel, by the Sanhedrim, by the priesthood, by the elders, and by the people. All this is in direct opposition to the Scriptures, and would involve a breach of promise on the part of God. Paul avoids this fatal conclusion by denying that the external Church is, as such, the true Church, or that the promises made to the latter were made to the former. (Princeton Review, October 1853).

Hodge: visibility and nature of the church I

The Jews claimed all these promises for the external organization, i. e. for the natural descendants of Abraham, united to him and to each other by the outward profession of the covenant, and by the sign of circumcision. They held, that external conformity to Judaism made a man a Jew, a member of that body to which all these promises and prerogatives belonged; and, consequently, that the apostacy or rejection of that external body would involve the destruction of the Church, and a failure of the promise of God. In like manner Ritualists teach that what is said and promised to the Church belongs to the external visible society of professing Christians, and that the destruction of that society would be the destruction of the Church.
In opposition to all this, Paul taught,

1. That he is not a Jew who is one outwardly.
2. Circumcision, which was outward, in the flesh, did not secure an interest in the divine promises.
3. That he only was a Jew, i. e. one of the true people of God, who was such in virtue of the state of his heart.
4. That the body to which the divine promises were made, was not the outward organization, but the inward, invisible body; not the Israel according to the flesh, but the Israel according to the spirit.

This is the Protestant doctrine of the Church, which teaches that he is not a Christian who is such by mere profession, and that it is not water baptism which makes a man a member of that body to which the promises are made, and consequently that the visibility of the Church is not that which belongs to an external society, but to true believers, or the communion of saints.

The same doctrine taught by the apostle Paul, is no less plainly taught by the apostle John. In his day many who had been baptized, and received into the communion of the external society of Christians, were not true believers. How were they regarded by the apostle? Did their external profession make them members of the true Church, to which the promises pertain? St. John answers this question by saying, " They went out from us, but they were not of us; for if they had been of us, they would no doubt have continued with us: but they went out, that it might be made manifest that they were not all of us. But ye have an unction from the Holy One, and ye know all things." 1 John ii. 19, 20. It is here taught,

1. That many are included in the pale of the external Church, who are not members of the true Church.
2. That those only who have an unction of the Holy One, leading them into the knowledge of the truth, constitute the Church.
3. And consequently the visibility of the Church is that which belongs to the body of true believers.

The great argument, however, on this subject, is the utter incongruity between what the Bible teaches concerning the Church, and the Romish doctrine that the Church is visible as an external organization. If that is so, then such organization is the Church; then, as the Church is holy, the body and bride of Christ, the temple and family of God, all the members of that organization are holy, members of Christ's body, and partakers of his life. Then, too, as Christ has promised to guide his Church into the knowledge of the truth, that external organization can never err as to any essential doctrine. Then, also, as we are commanded to obey the Church, if we refuse submission to this external body, we are to be regarded as heathen men and publicans. Then, moreover, as Christ saves all the members of his body and none other, he saves all included in this external organization, and consigns to eternal death-all out of it. And then, finally, ministers admit to heaven all whom they receive into this society, and cast into hell all whom they reject from it. These are not only the logical, but the avowed and admitted conclusions of the principle in question.

It becomes those who call themselves Protestants, to look these consequences in the face, before they join the Papists and Puseyites in ridiculing the idea of a Church composed exclusively of believers, and insist that the body to which the attributes and promises of the Church belong, is the visible organization of professing Christians. ( Princeton Review, October 1853.)

Owen on totus Christus

David Field has some interesting stuff on totus Christus, here and here, the former of which he generously attributes to me - (I seem to remember being in the room at the time David put the pieces together).

For Augustine totus Christus is an important doctine which unites Christology and Ecclesiology by affirming the real connection of Christ, the head, to the Church, his body. The concept has been summarised as “Christ, as head, is always present and active in his body, the church; the church and Christ form one single person.”

Thus one reads the following passage from Augustine's Homilies on the Gospel of John:

Then let us rejoice and give thanks that we are made not only Christians, but Christ. Do you understand, brothers, and apprehend the grace of God upon us? Marvel, be glad, we are made Christ. For if he is the head, we are the members: the whole man is he and we… The fullness of Christ, then, is head and members. Head and members, what is that? Christ and the Church (In. Io. XXI.8).

Concerned that the concept that we have no Christ without the Church takes away from the uniqueness of Christ, making him incomplete, I've looked around to find the concept if not the language of totus Christus being used elsewhere in later Protestant thought.

So here is John Owen from Vol. 5 'The Doctrine of Justification by Faith', section viii 'Imputation of the sins of the church unto Christ'. It's great!

This, then, I say, is the foundation of the imputation of the sins of the church unto Christ,-- namely, that he and it are one person; the grounds whereof we must inquire into.

But hereon sundry discourses do ensue, and various inquiries are made,--What a person is? In what sense, and in how many senses, that word may be used? What is the true notion of it? What is a natural person? What a legal, civil, or political person? In the explication whereof some have fallen mistakes. And if we should enter into this field, we need not fear matter enough of debate and altercation. But I must needs say, that these things belong not unto our present occasion; nor is the union of Christ and the church illustrated, but obscured by them.

For Christ and believers are neither one natural person, nor a legal or political person, nor any such person as the laws, customs, or usages of men do know or allow of. They are one mystical person; whereof although there may be some imperfect resemblances found in natural or political unions, yet the union from whence that denomination is taken between him and us is of that nature, and arises from such reasons and causes, as no personal union among men (or the union of many persons) has any concernment in. And therefore, as to the representation of it unto our weak understandings, unable to comprehend the depth of heavenly mysteries, it is compared unto unions of divers kinds and natures.

So is it represented by that of man and wife; not as unto those mutual affections which give them only a moral union, but from the extraction of the first woman from the flesh and bone of the first man, and the institution of God for the individual society of life thereon. This the apostle at large declares, Eph.5:25-32: whence he concludes, that from the union thus represented, "We are members of his body, of his flesh, and of his bones," verse 30; or have such a relation unto him as Eve had to Adam, when she was made of his flesh and bone, and so was one flesh with him. So, also, it is compared unto the union of the head and members of the same natural body, 1 Cor.12:12; and unto a political union also, between a ruling or political head and its political members; but never exclusively unto the union of a natural head and its members comprised in the same expression, Eph.4:15; Col.2:19. And so also unto sundry things in nature, as a vine and its branches, John 15:1,2. And it is declared by the relation that was between Adam and his posterity, by God's institution and the law of creation, Rom.5:12, etc.

And the Holy Ghost, by representing the union that is between Christ and believers by such a variety of resemblances, in things agreeing only in the common or general notion of union, on various grounds, does sufficiently manifest that it is not of, nor can be reduced unto, any one kind of them.

And this will yet be made more evident by the consideration of the causes of it, and the grounds whereinto it is resolved. But whereas it would require much time and diligence to handle them at large, which the mention of them here, being occasional, will not admit, I shall only briefly refer unto the heads of them:

1. The first spring or cause of this union, and of all the other causes of it, lies in that eternal compact that was between the Father and the Son concerning the recovery and salvation of fallen mankind. Herein, among other things, as the effects thereof, the assumption of our nature (the foundation of this union) was designed. The nature and terms of this compact, counsel, and agreement, I have declared elsewhere; and therefore must not here again insist upon it. But the relation between Christ and the church, proceeding from hence, and so being an effect of infinite wisdom, in the counsel of the Father and Son, to be made effectual by the Holy Spirit, must be distinguished from all other unions or relations whatever.

2. The Lord Christ, as unto the nature which he was to assume, was hereon predestinated unto grace and glory. He was "proegnoosmenos",- -"foreordained," predestinated, "before the foundation of the world," 1 Pet.1:20; that is, he was so, as unto his office, so unto all the grace and glory required thereunto, and consequent thereon. All the grace and glory of the human nature of Christ was an effect of free divine preordination. God chose it from all eternity unto a participation of all which it received in time. Neither can any other cause of the glorious exaltation of that portion of our nature be assigned.

3. This grace and glory whereunto he was preordained was twofold:

(1.) That which was peculiar unto himself;

(2.) That which was to be communicated, by and through him, unto the church.

(1.) Of the first sort was the "charis henooseoos",--the grace of personal union; that single effect of divine wisdom (whereof there is no shadow nor resemblance in any other works of God, either of creation, providence, or grace), which his nature was filled withal: "Full of grace and truth." And all his personal glory, power, authority, and majesty as mediator, in his exaltation at the right hand of God, which is expressive of them all, do belong hereunto. These things were peculiar unto him, and all of them effects of his eternal predestination. But,

(2.) He was not thus predestinated absolutely, but also with respect unto that grace and glory which in him and by him was to be communicated unto the church.

Preach! preacher, woo, woo, woo!

It was Richard Sibbes who said the, 'To preach is to woo', explaining it thus

The preachers are 'paranymphi', the friends of the bridegroom, that are to procure the marriage between Christ and his Church; therefore they are not only to lay open the riches of her husband, Christ, but likewise to entreat for a marriage, and to use all the gifts and parts that God hath given them to bring Christ and his Church together. (Works Vol. V)

Powlison on Cosmetic Saviours

Nothing for a month but when I saw this I just had to link to it.

Bahnsen's theonomic hermeneutic

In By No Other Standard, Bahnsen notes that a distinction between the ceremonial and moral law can be validly drawn and alludes to Hosea 6:6 and Ephesians 2:5 to support this. While noting that some laws have both ceremonial and moral elements to them he suggest that Israel did not need Old Testament law to be "written out in delineated literary subsections in order for them to be, nevertheless, clearly distinguishable." Further, Bahnsen claims that with the "coming of New Covenant revelation which helps us understand even better the meaning and purpose of Old Covenant commands, the cogency and necessity of something life the moral/ceremonial distinction becomes all the more apparent." (BNOS 97)

The distinction between moral and ceremonial laws can be explained thus:

Moral laws reflect the absolute righteousness and judgment of God, guiding man’s life into the paths of righteousness; such laws define holiness and sin, restrain evil through punishment of infractions, and drive the sinner to Christ for salvation.

On the other hand, ceremonial laws — or redemptive provisions — reflect the mercy of God in saving those who have violated His moral standards; such laws define the way of redemption, typify Christ’s saving economy, and maintain the holiness (or “separation”) of the redeemed community. (BTS 135-6)

Ceremonial laws were binding to Jews not Gentiles and displayed the way of redemption. Moral laws, on the other hand, were to be emulated as the effect of redemption. Thus Judaizers are those who seek to enforce ceremonial boundary marking laws on Gentiles under the New Covenant, laws that had been abrogated under Christ (Eph. 2:15). For Bahnsen it is then, ceremonial law that is the schoolmaster whom, "we are no longer under in our Christ-given maturity".

But in that Bahnsen can affirm that ceremonial law was a "foreshadow of the Messiah and His redemming work, applied to the Jews (and to us) by faith", he does not deny that Old Covenant ceremonial ritual has import into New Covenant ceremony.

theonomic hermeneutics

Here is Bahnsen (No Other Standard - Appendix B: Poythress as a Theonomist) on Poythress (The Shadow of Christ in the Law of Moses) on theonomy and specifically hermeneutical method.

Poythress agrees with theonomists that “all the commandments of the law are binding on Christians,” and he then adds that “the way” in which they are binding is determined by Christ’s authority and “the fulfillment that takes place in His work”; “the way in which each law is fulfilled in Christ determines the way in which it is to be observed now” (pp. 268, 269). He writes that “Christ’s work defines the true nature of continuity and discontinuity between Old and New Testament situations” (p. 286). These are true enough, as formal statements. The question now becomes how this fulfillment is to be defined by the faithful student of Scripture – by the text of Scripture interpreting redemption for us, or by the theologian’s creative and abstract notions of what the age of redemption means?

The dispute between Poythress and theonomy, it seems to me, is over the way in which the discontinuities with the Old Testament law are to be identified in the Bible. We would have to say that Poythress’ general hermeneutical style is not adequately controlled by the text of Scripture. As we saw above, he gives too much room to playful imagination and loose, ambiguous, thematic connections for there to be any confidence in his conclusions. His reasoning has little protection from unreliability and arbitrariness. You can prove just about anything by means of it. Thus it is theologically unacceptable. To use Poythress’ own words: “If we do not pay careful, detailed attention to explicit texts, we may be filling ourselves merely with our own ideas” (p.350).

It is much safer and Biblically sound to presume continuity with Old Testament moral demands (Deut. 4:2; Matt. 5:17-19) – as properly understood through exegesis of their own original text and context — and then allow specific, relevant texts in the rest of Scripture to amplify or transform or even put aside those requirements, given the inauguration of the radically new age of salvation brought by Christ (e.g., the paradigm of Acts 10). This does not exclude the use of topological interpretation, nor does it prevent reasoning by analogy (regarding classes of laws). It simply demands that the premises of such arguments be justiilable on the basis of textual exegesis.

The danger in having only as yet read this appendix from Bahnsen is that presently I'm in the dark about how/if Bahnsen is going to distinguish between moral and ceremonial / ritual laws. Even if as Leithart states this classification is 'legally unworkable and practically awkward', assuming we are able to draw some distinction between here, would the same principle outlined in the final paragraph of the Bahnsen quote hold also for ceremonial law?

exegetical presuppositions

Longenecker (Bibilical Exegesis 93-95) points out that it has been observed that “it is doubtful whether we can hope to understand the contents of any mind whose presuppositions we have not yet learned to recognize.” If we are to appreciate the exegetical practices of the apostolic writers, it is necessary to have an awareness of their basic hermeneutical outlooks and attitudes. He then lists four major exegetical presuppositions in early Christian preaching.

Corporate Solidarity. In the first place, the concept of “corporate solidarity” or “corporate personality” had a profound effect upon the exegesis of early Jewish Christians. The concept has been defined as “that important Semitic complex of thought in which there is a constant oscillation between the individual and the group—family, tribe, or nation—to which he belongs, so that the king or some other representative figure may be said to embody the group, or the group may be said to sum up the host of individuals.” The precise nature of the relationships involved is not always entirely clear from the literature of the Jews, nor from that of their semitic neighbors. Probably this is due in large measure to the fact that “ancient literature never does fit exactly into our categories.” But though there are uncertainties as to precisely how the idea expressed itself in ancient life generally and as to the degree of influence it exerted in specific instances in the literature, there seems to be little question of its presence in the structure of Jewish and early Jewish Christian thought.

In biblical exegesis, the concept of corporate solidarity comes to the fore in the treatment of relationships between the nation or representative figures within the nation, on the one hand, and the elect remnant or the Messiah, on the other. It allows the focus of attention to “pass without explanation or explicit indication from one to the other, in a fluidity of transition which seems to us unnatural.”

Correspondences in History. Stemming in part from the concept of corporate solidarity is the understanding of history or, at any rate, of the history of the people of God as evidencing a unity in its various parts which is there by divine ordination. For both Jew and Jewish Christian, historical occurrences are “built upon a certain pattern corresponding to God’s design for man His creature.” This is but one aspect of a larger Hebrew-Christian Weltanschauung, wherein the nature of man, the relations between man and man (contemporary, past and future), the interaction between man and the universe, and the relation of both to God, their Creator and Redeemer, are viewed in wholistic fashion. In such a view, history is neither endlessly cyclical nor progressively developing due to forces inherent in it. Nor can it be considered in a secular manner. Rather, in all its movements and in all its varied episodes, it is expressive of the divine intent and explicating the divine will. With such an understanding of history, early Christians were prepared to trace correspondences between God’s activity of the past and his action in the present—between events then and events now, between persons then and persons now. Such correspondences were not just analogous in nature, or to be employed by way of illustration. For the early Christians they were incorporated into history by divine intent, and therefore to be taken typologically. Their presence in the history of a former day is to be considered as elucidating and furthering the redemptive message of the present.

Eschatological Fulfilment. An obvious presupposition also affecting early Jewish Christian interpretation is the consciousness of living in the days of eschatological fulfilment Peter’s sermon on the day of Pentecost begins with the assertion that the “last days” are being actualized now. And this theme is recurrent throughout the preaching of the earliest Christians. As with the covenanters of Qumran, early Jewish believers in Jesus understood their ancient Scriptures in an eschatological context. Unlike the Dead Sea sectarians, however, whose eschatology was mainly proleptic and anticipated, Christians were convinced that the coming of the Messianic Age was an accomplished fact. Messiahship had been realized in Jesus of Nazareth, and the last days inaugurated with him. While awaiting final consummation, their eschatology was rooted in and conditioned by what had already happened in the immediate past. The decisive event had occurred, and, in a sense, all else was epilogue.

Messianic Presence. In addition, as F. F. Bruce reminds us, the New Testament interpretation of the Old Testament is not only eschatological but Christological.” For the earliest believers, this meant (1) that the living presence of Christ, through his Spirit, was to be considered a determining factor in all their biblical exegesis, and (2) that the Old Testament was to be interpreted Christocenrically. W. D. Davies has pointed out that at least in popular and haggadic circles within Judaism, there existed the expectation that with the coming of the Messiah the enigmatic and obscure in the Torah “would be made plain.” And such an expectation seems to have become a settled conviction among the early Christians, as evidenced by the exegetical practices inherent in their preaching.

Longenecker on NT exegesis

It has become all too common in theological circles today to hear assertions as to what God must have done or what must have been the case during the apostolic period of the Church—and to find that such assertions are based principally upon deductions from a given system of theology or supported by contemporary analogy alone. The temptation is always with us to mistake hypothesis for evidence, and to judge our theological and historical formulations by their coherence and widespread acceptance rather than first of all by their correspondence to historical and exegetical data. History is replete with examples of this sorry condition and its sorry results, and hindsight permits us to recognize it in the past for what it was: a perversion of truth. But we are “sons of our fathers,” composed of the same stuff and subject to the same pressures and temptations. And nowhere do we need to guard against our own inclinations and various pressures more carefully than in our understanding of the New Testament writers’ use of the Old Testament. Neither piety nor speculation—both of which are excellent in their own ways when properly controlled—can here substitute for careful historical and exegetical investigation. Nor can traditional views of either the right or the left be allowed to stand unscrutinized in light of recent discoveries.

The Jewish roots of Christianity make it a priori likely that the exegetical procedures of the New Testament would resemble to some extent those of then contemporary Judaism. This has long been established with regard to the hermeneutics of Paul and the Talmud, and it is becoming increasingly evident with respect to the Qumran texts as well. In view of these materials and the light they throw on early Christian presuppositions and practices, we must abandon the mistaken idea that the New Testament writers’ treatment of the Old Testament was either (1) an essentially mechanical process, whereby explicit “proof-texts” and exact “fulfillments” were brought together, or (2) an illegitimate twisting and distortion of the ancient text. It is true, of course, that literal fulfillment of a direct sort occurs as one factor in the New Testament. The Christian claim to continuity with the prophets could hardly have been supported were there no such cases. And it is also true that the exegesis of the early Christians often appears forced and artificial, particularly when judged by modem criteria But neither approach does justice to the essential nature of New Testament hermeneutics, for both ignore the basic patterns of thought and common exegetical methods employed in the Jewish milieu in which the Christian faith came to birth.

There is little indication in the New Testament that the authors themselves were conscious of varieties of exegetical genre or of following particular modes of interpretation. At least they seem to make no sharp distinctions between what we would call historico-grammatical exegesis, illustration by way of analogy, midrash exegesis, pesher interpretation, allegorical treatment, and interpretation based on a “corporate solidarity” understanding of people and events in redemptive history. All of these are employed in their writings in something of a blended and interwoven fashion, even though there are certain discernible patterns and individual emphases in their usage. What the New Testament writers are conscious of, however, is interpreting the Old Testament (1) from a Christocentric perspective, (2) in conformity with a Christian tradition, and (3) along Christological lines. And in their exegesis there is the interplay of Jewish presuppositions and practices, on the one hand, with Christian commitments and perspectives on the other, which joined to produce a distinctive interpretation of the Old Testament.

Richard N. Longenecker, Biblical Exegesis in the Apostolic Period 205-6

typological snippets II

In the same collection of essays Francis Foulkes writes

we should not look back to this part of the Bible just for the history of the Jewish religion, nor just for moral examples, nor just for its messianic prophecy, nor to see the excelence of the faith of Israel in contrast to the religious faith andf understanding of the other nations of antiquity... We look to the Old testament to see God in his grace revealing himself in the history of Israel in preperation for the sending of his Son, the Incarnate Word and the Saviour of the world.

We study the Old Testament typologically, for we study it to gain a theological understanding of history; and that theological understanding is christological understanding, for it is only in Christ that the history of Israel, or of any nation or individual, past or present, is able to find its meaning. (370-1)

typological snippets

A few snippets from David L. Baker, on typological reading of Scripture, taken from his chapter in 'The Right Doctrine From The Wrong Texts: Essays On The Use Of The Old Testament In The New'. After defining

a type as a biblical event, person, or institution which serves as an example or pattern for other events, persons or institutions;

typology as the study of types and the historical and theological correspondences between them,

and further stating that the basis of typology is God's consistent activity in the history of his chosen people, he goes on to say:

'There is something even more basic about the idea of analogy or typology: it is the way in which almost any biblical text (Old Testament or New Testament) addresses us. The Bible does not generally contain propositions but stories and these can only be relevant in the sense of being typical. What significance would Abraham or Moses have for us if they were not typical? It is of no relevance to us that a frog can hop or that a snake can bite. It is because Abraham and Moses were men like us (James 5:17) and as such encountered the same God as we do, in other words because they were typical, that their experiences are directly relevant to us.' (Baker 323)

'The function of typology is therefore not to find a procedure for using the Old Testament but to point to the consistent working of God in the experience of his people so that parallels may be drawn between different events, persons and institutions and individual events may be seen as examples or patterns for others. Typology cannot be used for exegesis, because its concern is not primarily with the words of the text but with the events recorded in it. This means also that Old Testament exegesis is freed from the pressure to be relevant: often the narrator had recorded only a bare event, but in this very lack of interpretation it may have typical and thus theological significance.' (Baker 329)

'Typology points to the fundamental analogy between different parts of the Bible.... This means that the Old Testament illuminates he New Testament and New Testament illuminates the Old Testament.... although it is not a method of exegesis, typology supplements exegesis by throwing further light on the text in question. The most closely related discipline to the study of the Old Testament is therefore that of the New Testament: ancient Oriental and Jewish studies clarify details of the Old Testament but lack the intrinsic analogy of New Testament studies to Old Testament studies. The corollary is that the most closely related discipline to New Testament is that of the Old Testament... On the one hand a correct understanding of the Old Testament depends on the New Testament, and on the other hand one of the primary uses of the Old Testament is to be the basis for a correct understanding and use of the New Testament.' (Baker 329)

Dever on Preaching the Gospel Demand

In a society where people want everything as optional Mark Dever's reminder on how to preach the gospel is note-worthy.

"When we hold forth the good news in our preaching, we should particularly beware of presenting this gospel as an option to be exercised for the betterment of sinners’ lives. After all, what would a carnal person consider "better"? Leading questions like "are you scared of death?" "Do you want happiness?" "Wouldn’t you like to know the meaning of your life?" are all well-intentioned, and any of them may be used by God’s Spirit to convict someone, and to lead to their conversion. But such questions may also be answered by a simple "no." To use such questions as if they are the starting point for those considering the gospel is to make it sound all too optional.

I don’t care if my hearers are scared of death, wanting happiness or meaning in life, I know that they will die and stand before God to give an account of their lives. And I know that God will theref

...

This demand—rather than a marketer’s appeal—is to be the basis of the evangelistic call in our sermons. Our gospel sermons are not to sound like the solicitations of a salesman, but the summons of a judge."

CCEL revamp

While looking around for material from Augustine I noticed that The Christian Classics Ethereal Library, CCEL, has had a makeover and promises to be easier than ever to locate historical documents from church history. They've even added a forum for site members to ask questions and post comments. Invaluable!

plebs, priests and unbelieving partners

I'm currently reading through Leithart's thesis, 'The Priesthood of The Plebs' which seeks to demonstrate how Christian baptism initiates priesthood so that baptism should be seen as the fulfillment of Aaronic ordination. Chapter 1, which Leithart notes in his preface, contains 'vignettes from the history of sacramental theology ..(that are) far to compressed to make much sense to anyone unfamiliar with the debates' [I definitely fall into this group] is excellent in stating the case for where he thinks Reformed and modern sacramental theology has gone wrong. His contention, following Augustine, is that The New is a ‘conjugation’ of the Old and therefore a ‘treatise on the sacraments of the Old Law must serve as prolegomena to a treatise on the sacraments in general’, something much of post medieval Christian tradition has singly failed to do.

By the time he gets to Chapter 4. Leithart applies his findings from the previous chapters to infant baptism. In seeking to demonstrate how infants contribute positively as members of the Christian priesthood and should therefore be baptised, Leithart quotes Mark Searle

a newborn infant alters the configuration of family relationships from the day of its birth, if not sooner, having a major impact on the lives of its parents and siblings. . . . Children will test the sacrificial self-commitment, the self-delusions, and the spurious faith of those with whom they come in contact for any length of time. They summon parents particularly to a deeper understanding of the mystery of grace and of the limitations of human abilities. . . . All this is merely to suggest that in their own way children in fact play an extremely active, even prophetic, role in the household of faith. The obstacle lies not in the child but in the faithlessness of the adult believers (153).

But, on the basis of 1 Cor. 7:14, to which Leithart alludes to suggest infants of believers are holy, shouldn't there be an analogous requirement for unbelieving husbands, whom Paul also identifies as holy, to also be considered as those contributing positively as members of the Christian priesthood.

an unbelieving husband alters the configuration of family relationships from the day of the spouses conversion, if not sooner, having a major impact on the lives of the believing spouse and any children they have. . . . The unbelieving husband will test the sacrificial self-commitment, the self-delusions, and the spurious faith of those with whom they come in contact for any length of time. They summon the believing spouse particularly to a deeper understanding of the mystery of grace and of the limitations of human abilities. . . . All this is merely to suggest that in their own way unbelieving husbands in fact play an extremely active, even prophetic, role in the household of faith. The obstacle lies not in the unbelieving husband but in the faithlessness of the adult believers.

I don't know any paedobaptist's who would want to affirm the above for unbelieving husbands, so why use this method of reasoning for the analogous case of infants?

temporizers and apostasy

Joel Garver has a really interesting article here outlining a generally oriented FV position and I think rightly identifying it within the bound of orthodoxy. However my question would be 'Is the salvation that all covenant members, including those who will finally fall away experience, a benefit that is purchased by Christ's atonement and if so what does this do for our doctrine of limited atonement?' All of the benefits of salvation that come to the eschatologically saved are purchased by Christ’s blood. Do the temporal and yet shared and real benefits that come to those covenant members who will finally apostatize come to them in the same manner, as purchased by Christ, or is this merely God’s ‘common grace’, with the shared benefit’s that the ‘temporarily faithful’ gain merely by association.

Maybe this could be a false dichotomy, but while not all traditional Reformed thinking would not want to affirm the former, the later appears to prompt difficulties for FV proponents who want to promote an objective covenant where all within that covenant receive blessings by virtue of their own real and full inclusion.

Interestingly I think this is where the marriage analogy just doesn’t help. All those who receive the sign of the ordinance are truly found within that relationship and are recipients of such benefits as the objective relationship entails. But as the elect receive all of the benefits of the objective relationship they have entered into as the purchased gifts of Christ’s death – on what grounds do those in the covenant who will fall away receive the benefits that come to them. The marriage analogy does not seem to fit this at all.

Sacramental Hermeneutics

Leithart notes his frustration with Berkhof's typological assumptionshere, claiming that the move from the purely carnal and external to the purely spiritual and internal between antitype and type is more in line with Baptist theology. No thanks Peter, you can keep him.

Anyway, he picks up the same theme in his chapter in The Case for Covenant Communion entitled 'Sacramental Hermeneutics and the Ceremonies of Israel', in which he highlights, what is to me, the weakness of the paedo-baptism and paedo-communion argument. (Leithart refers to these generically as the paedo-argument). Leithart begins by stating that Reformed paedo-arguments basically hold the following logic.

Children were included in Israel in the OT, Israel and the church are the same people, bearers of the same promise, therefore just as children (males) were marked for inclusion by circumcision and children ate with their parents at the feasts of Israel in the old covenant, so children should be marked for inclusion by baptism and participate in the Christian feast under the new covenant.

Leithart acknowledges that these paedo-arguments raise several hermeneutical questions, among which are:

1. They assume that 'ceremonial' regulations of the old covenant have 'ceremonial' import in the new. Whilst Leithart acknowledges that the 'ceremonial' / 'moral' distinction is 'legally unworkable and practically awkward' he suggests that it is wrong simply to 'moralise', 'spiritualise' or 'humanise' the OT ceremonial regulations, if the NT warrents that they can support NT ceremonial practices.

2. Further, the paedo-arguments assume a typological hermeneutic in whihc the OT persons, institutions, and events not only typify Jesus Christ but also have some regulatory authority in the church. In Augustinian terms, these arguments assume that the OT is typological not of Jesus simply but of the totus Christus, the whole Christ, both head and body.

3. Paedo-arguments assume that in the midst of discontinuities between the institutions of the old and the new there is continuity. The question is, how do the arguments determine which features shared by circumcision-baptism and Passover-Supper are relevant and which are not. (112-113)

Leithart deals most fully with points 1. and 2. in his chapter and states that

Though not often admitted, accepting the paedo-arguments involves a prior commitment to particular answers to these problems. Accepting that infant circumcision supports infant baptism logically entails accepting the ceremonial regulations of the Old can be applied as ceremonial regulations in the New. And accepting that the inclusion of children at the Passover is an argument for their inclusion at the Lord's Supper assumes that we are capable of discerning a specific point (or points) of similarity between the two meals in the midst of their evident dissimilarities.

That these assumptions go largely unexamined is evident from the inconsistent hermeneutical practices of some paedobaptists. Applying the logic of the paedo-arguments, some (myself included) have argued that the sacrifical procedures of the Levitical law govern the order and procedures of Christian worship. That is, the ceremonial regulations and patterens of animal offerings in Leviticus provides a pattern for the ceremonies of worship in the church.(113)

The point is that after dealing with 1 Corinthians 5, 9, 10; Acts 15:20, 29; Romans 15:15-16 and briefly alluding to Hebrews 13:10-13, Leithart concludes the chapter thus

This exploration has not uncovered any knock-down text that proves the paedo-arguments beyond a shadow of doubt. But it has, I hope, given a plausible account of, and justification for, one key assuption of those arguments.(129)

That key assumption that Leithart hopes he has given a plausible account of are hermeneutical issues 1. and 2. above, but it is far from clear that he has been sucessful. At most, from a mixture of Romans 15 and 1 Corinthians 9 Leithart may demonstrate that the ceremonial regulations of the old can tropologically apply as ceremonial regulations in the new. But it is unclear how this application should be made if valid, and especially if the point of application supports the paedo-arguments. My suggestion is it doesn't and that Leithart fails to give anywhere near conclusive evidence that it does.

Leithart's suggests that his account of how the priestly ministry and accompanying benefits (access to meat from sacrifices) have moved from the sole preserve of the Levitical order under the old, to the priesthood of all believers under the new supports paedo-communion, given that children are to be included in the holy priesthood based on 1 Cor. 7:14. But even conceeding Leithart's understanding of 1 Cor. 7:14 as correct, which I wouldn't want to, this appears suprising weak for someone so capable and who has spent so much time and effort on this subject. From Paul's statement that as an apostle he carries out priestly duties (Rom. 15:15-16) and that ministers of the gospel should be recompensed for their labours in the Lord even as those who ministered at the alter did (1 Cor. 9:13-14), Leithart maintains that all the Christian communtiy (including those holy infants) may partake of the Lord's supper.

Leithart appears to think that if he can prove that points 1.and 2. above occur in any way in Scripture, then this gives support for the paedo-arguments. I'd suggest that this is nowhere near the level of support required. Leithart would need to show that Scripture demonstrates the OT

• is typological not only for Jesus simply but for totus Christus specifically in respect to the paedo-arguments (point 2. above).
• and that the 'ceremonial' regulations of the old covenant have 'ceremonial' import into the new specifically with respect to the paedo-arguments.

One feels Leithart recognises he has failed to do this and acknowledges as much in his own conclusions.

Dagg on 1 Corinthians 7:14

Stan Reeves gives an interpretation of 1 Corinthians 7:14 here, based on John Dagg's understanding of this controversial verse. Dagg argues that Paul

is arguing from analogy rather than by cause/effect. If the unbelieving spouse is holy, the children are holy; if the unbelieving spouse is unclean, the children are unclean -- not because one causes the other but because they are like cases.

Covenant Communion

The Case for Covenant Communion is an interesting book, if for nothing else in that it shows the unanswerable inconsistency of administering one of the sacraments to infants and then withholding the other from them. Something that has been the practice of the overwhelming majority of the Reformed tradition from Geneva onwards and something Baptist’s have consistently highlighted.

Baptist’s have also too often been guilty of using this as a conclusive argument against Paedobaptists. As if somehow that by pointing out the inconsistency in their opponent’s argument, that by de facto proves that your argument must be right. Dream on! Actually the Paedobaptist’s answer to the Baptist’s cry of ‘Well you don’t allow your children to the table’ should always have been ‘No, but actually we should’. So the Auburn Avenue’s latest publication is also of value in removing a poor and all too frequent Baptist argument within this debate.

'tu quoque' cry the Baptists

Well at least those with a rudimentary grasp of Latin do. I mentioned here how Federal Vision proponents have rightly criticised Guy Waters for his misrepresentation of their views. To demonstrate there is much misrepresentation on both sides of this debate here are two examples I've come across since I wrote that blog entry by FV proponents misrepresenting a Baptist view.

First Leithart says here that

if you refuse to baptize infants, then you are saying that God's plans have changed. Once upon a time, God intended to form a new human race that would share His life and glory. But that plan failed, so He has now decided to gather together adults who will share in that life and glory.

No doubt some Dispensationalist Baptist's are guilty of considering that God's plan has changed as they understand him to move from intending to form a new humanity made up of people, including infants, from all stages of life in Israel to now working with the Church of Christ made up of those solely who are capable of making a profession. Yet this is certainly a false charge against the Baptist position I and those Baptists I know hold. Leithart's accusation that to deny paedobaptism is to understand God's plan as having changed is just incorrect.

If one understands God to have one redemptive plan whereby he is forming a new humanity to himself in Christ Jesus, which was in some ways foreshadowed in Old Testament Israel and which is fulfilled in the New Testament church, Leithart's charge won't stick. In the biblical story God redeems adult and infant both before and after Christ's incarnation and death, but the shift in the composition of the people with whom he is at work and how they are to be identified is part of the movement from shadow to fulfillment that exists between the Testaments on a Baptist understanding of that story.

Secondly, upon receiving my copy of The Case for Covenant Communion I flicked briefly to Rich Lusk's chapter on 'Infant Faith in the Psalter' having previously posted some thoughts on his treatment on this isuue in his book on paedofaith here. By page two Lusk states

Some have adamantly denied the possibility of infant faith. Certainly this has been true of the Anabaptist and Baptist traditions, but it has also been the case with many Reformed theologians as well. Others have vigorously affirmed infant faith, pointing to infants as the best illustrations of gospel grace. Apart from intellectual and rational abilities, the Spirit is able to regenerate and sanctify infants so that they have a kind of 'baby faith'. This view was advocated by Martin Luther, Ulrich Zwingli, John Calvin, and Zacharias Ursinus among others.

Let's give Lusk the benefit of the doubt and understand the some at the beginning of the quote as refering to some, but not all in the Baptist tradition. Even if this is the case, Lusk's association of a theological position with a whole tradition where only some in that movement hold to that stance is guilty of the same faulty method of argumentation that Waters uses against FV proponents and for which he has been rightly criticised.

To digress slightly, certainly the Anabaptists that Calvin came up against denied the possibility of infant faith. Their use of Deut. 1:39 to claim that infants who could not know right from wrong, could not actually know anything and could therefore not know God, was at least part of the reason Calvin shifts his defense of infant baptism from stating

no men are saved except by faith, whether they be children or adults. For this reason baptism also rightly applies to infants, who possess faith in common with adults

in the 1536 edition of his Institutes, to more reservedly writing in the 1559 edition

the Lord might shine with a tiny spark at the present time on those whom he will illumine in the future with the full splendor of his light.(IV.xvi.19)

This is neither the same faith nor the same knowledge of faith that is allotted to adults yet it has the same genus. For Calvin, the church therefore, is to baptise infants into future repentance and faith, and not as those presently possessing actual faith. Though neither of these has yet been formed in them,

the seed of both lies hidden within them by the secret working of the Spirit.(IV.xvi.20)

Calvin's shift from ascribing full faith to infants in 1536 to allowing them only a seed of faith addresses the Anabaptist criticism he faced and left him in a position where at least some Baptist's would be in agreement with respect to infant faith. Calvin however baptised infant's not because he thought they presently possessed faith but because of their prior inclusion in the covenant and elect of God based on the promise. Thus Lusk not only misrepresents Baptists who would want to affirm the possibility of a seed of faith in infants, but also I would suggest Calvin himself. Directly after the quotation above Lusk continues

They (Luther, Zwingli, Calvin, Ursinus) all connected faith with baptism. They insisted that faith was necessary to a right reception of the sacrament and that infants were capable (by grace) of such a right reception. Many early Reformers viewed infant faith as having a kind of normativity with regard to those infants born in the context of the church.(TCFCC 91)

Lusk seems to suggest that Calvin is one of those 'many early Reformers' but this is misrepresenting Calvin, who would have insisted faith was necessary to right reception of baptism and that infants were capable of faith, but does not understand present faith as being normative for those baptised in infancy. As a Baptist I'd want to affirm Calvin's 1559 position with respect to infant faith. Where I'd disagree with him is on all the children of believers being previously included in the covenant and elect of God based on the promise.

'and with the measure you use it will be measured to you' (Matt. 7:2). Whilst the level of misrepresentation in the current FV debate is concerning, making accusations against your opponent while not wrentching out the log in your own eye makes for hypocrisy. Lord, from such preserve us all.

Garver on Wright on Paul

Joel Garver has posted an excellent sympathetic summary of N T Wright's thoughts on Paul which is well worth a read for those unclear of the issues surrounding the current debate. Suggesting reasons for why Wright is loved by some and held in suspicion by others within evangelicalism he starts and ends his summary thus:

I was asked recently, by someone who has found what she's read of Tom Wright's work to be helpful and edifying, why his writings have been such a particular focus of criticism among evangelicals. Part of the answer is that Wright probably has a greater degree of direct influence over evangelical thought than many other contemporary mainstream New Testament scholars, thereby coming under closer scrutiny, as well as the fact that we tend to criticize most sharply those with whom we differ who are otherwise the closest to us.

Though these comments are brief, perhaps for some they will help defuse the overly simplistic notion that Wright is of a piece with some wider "new perspective" movement. These comments might also help clear up some of the common misunderstandings and misconstruals of his work, in order that genuine disagreements can be pursued without unnecessary distraction from the relevant issues.

Lusk on normative infant faith

In Rich Lusk’s Peadofaith, he seeks to make the case for the normacy of infant faith within the covenant community. For Lusk faith in covenant infants is to be presumed in order for one to practice paedobaptism as ‘to baptise unbelieving subjects would profane and abuse baptism just as much as inviting unbelievers to the Lord’s Table would abuse the sacramental meal.’ While some may affirm paedofaith as normative from a judgement of charity, Lusk prefers to hold this as being the case from God’s covenant promises.

To support the claim that paedofaith within the community was considered normative within Scripture and therefore should be considered as normative by Christians today Lusk quotes Psalm 22:9-10, 71:5-6 and 139:14-15 as examples of infant faith in the Psalter.

Ps. 22:9 Yet it was you who took me from the womb; you kept me safe on my mother's breast. On you I was cast from my birth, and since my mother bore me you have been my God.

Ps. 71:5 For you, O Lord, are my hope, my trust, O LORD, from my youth. Upon you I have leaned from my birth; it was you who took me from my mother's womb. My praise is continually of you.

Ps. 139:14 I praise you, for I am fearfully and wonderfully made. Wonderful are your works; that I know very well. My frame was not hidden from you, when I was being made in secret, intricately woven in the depths of the earth.

He suggests that these passages demonstrate not just God’s knowledge of David as an infant but also David’s corresponding knowledge of God. This, along with the language of the Psalter as a whole demonstrate David’s covenantal relationship with God from birth and thereby acts as a rebuke to today’s prevalent conversionist mentality of believing parents to their children. Thus ‘you have been my God’ and ‘upon you have I leaned from my mothers womb’ is David’s testimony even though whilst not requiring self-conscious knowledge in his earliest days. Indeed the fact that the Psalmist claims to have had paedofaith at a time when he was unconscious of it based solely from his understanding of the promise of God, demonstrate that this is to be the paradigm for all within the covenant community as they view their infancy. Thus Lusk states that before a child of the promise can do either good or bad, God is already his God as David evidences as he views his infancy from those promises (Gen. 17:7).

Importantly Lusk is keen to stress that the paedofaith owned by the psalmist it not a ‘one-in-a-million’ case. The description of his faith is located in Israel’s public hymnbook to be used in corporate worship so that each covenant member would have been encouraged to own this liturgy as their own and ‘would have been expected to be able to identity with them in some sort of fashion.’ Thus paedofaith is claimed to be ‘normative’, ‘paradigmatic’ and ‘expected’ within the covenant community, both for Israel then and Christians now, founded on God’s promise. This is God’s ordinary dealing with covenant infants from the womb.


In response to Lusk, it would firstly be wrong to deny the possibility of infant faith, with the Holy Spirit working as he will to regenerate from conception thereby causing even the youngest embryo to move from being in Adam to in Christ. The larger question that Lusk asks and seeks to answer affirmatively is whether this possession of faith from earliest life is to be considered normative within the covenant community.

With respect to Lusk’s use of the language found within these Psalms one need not however resort to a normative understanding of paedofaith to explain it. Cannot any member who has entered the covenant through an adult conversion truly say that God’s hand was upon them to call them to himself even while they lived consciously and unconsciously in rebellion against him. Certainly the language of Ps. 22 and 139 appear to be understandable this way without implying infant faith. Before God works in the lives of the pagan, Hindu or the Muslim to cause them to own Christ as their Saviour and King, the one true God is in a very real sense already their God, which they will testify to after conversion in their recognition that previously they had worshiped idols and false gods.

But it is quite possible to affirm Lusk’s understanding of these passages and to agree that the Psalmist never knew a time when he did not trust the Lord. We must therefore read ‘you have been my God’ in Ps. 22:10 to denote not only that the Psalmist considers that God is the only God and Lord whether one confesses him to be or not, but that as Ps. 71 apparently intimates, he had owned and trusted God from his earliest moments.

However is this experience, which as Lusk rightly points out became part of the covenant community’s liturgy, to be considered as paradigmatic for each member as something they could identify with ‘in some sort of fashion’? It is only if this is true and paedofaith can be considered normative that paedobaptism is warrantable on the basis of presumed faith in the infants of believers.

It is difficult to see how Lusk can make a case for this, especially in the light of Psalm 22 as a whole. Lusk rightly notes that the experience described in the Psalm cannot be split, attributing some of it David and some to the Messiah. All recounted was true, in somewhat various ways of both David and David’s greater son. Yet if Lusk is seeking to make a case that paedofaith is normative within the covenant community based on the fact of each member of the assembly identifying with the words of the Psalmist, then it is odd that the language of v. 1-2 of the Psalm should also be considered as paradigmatic for them:

Ps. 22:1-2 My God, my God, why have you forsaken me? Why are you so far from helping me, from the words of my groaning? 2 O my God, I cry by day, but you do not answer; and by night, but find no rest.

Again one must agree that the language of the whole of Psalm 22 is a true description of both David’s and Messiah’s experience, but are we to understand that all of the community are to experience the feeling of being forsaken by God – and that this is in fact ‘normative’, ‘paradigmatic’, ‘expected’! I’d want to affirm that this can be the case, but whether it’s something is normative is highly questionable.

Even if Ps. 22:12-20 contains metaphorical language as Lusk claims, read in the same manner that he suggests for those verses he uses to support normative paedofaith, it must still in some way be paradigmatic for all of the covenant community but it not clear that this language is meant to be taken as normative for each member in the community.

Ps. 22:12-20 Many bulls encircle me, strong bulls of Bashan surround me; they open wide their mouths at me, like a ravening and roaring lion. I am poured out like water, and all my bones are out of joint; my heart is like wax; it is melted within my breast; my mouth is dried up like a potsherd, and my tongue sticks to my jaws; you lay me in the dust of death. For dogs are all around me; a company of evildoers encircles me. My hands and feet have shriveled; I can count all my bones. They stare and gloat over me; they divide my clothes among themselves, and for my clothing they cast lots. But you, O LORD, do not be far away! O my help, come quickly to my aid! Deliver my soul from the sword, my life from the power of the dog!

This leads one to consider whether the Psalms are meant to be read and ‘owned’ by each member of the community, as readily and in as un-nuanced a fashion as Lusk seems to claim. The Baptist need not deny the possibly of infant faith within the community, but it appears that certainly from these Psalms, one need nor ought to imply that paedofaith is normative and to be presumed. Where this cannot be done the practice of paedobaptism is questionable on Lusk’s own admission.

Representing opponents fairly

Guy Waters' new book on the Federal Vision has come in for some heavy criticism by those he seeks to critique, over his mis-representation of their position. Sadly they have a point. In failing to agree to meet with those whose doctrine he considers in the book, especially when several of them had offered to meet with him in advance of publication to confirm he had represented them faithfully, Waters surely shot himself firmly in both feet.

As someone who is by no means convinced by Federal Vision theology and yet wants an informed critique it has been frustrating to read this book. Indeed, it's difficult to see how this book will progress the debate in any constructive manner and one fears that it will only see proponents on either side of the debate further entrench themselves behind party lines.

Of more concern, the current level of interaction and debate around this issue shows little willingness to seek to understand nuances within their opponent's position or to demonstrate brotherly love that believes, hopes and endures all things and forgives seventy times seven.

Presumed Child Covenant Membership

Those who baptise children in infancy often question the Baptist's reluctance to administer the sacrament to those young children who profess faith due to the difficulty of determining the genuiness of such a profession. Whilst acknowledging that the real debate lies elsewhere in the assumptions that are being made for any children born into the covenant community, the Baptist is entirely justified to redirect the question back to their Paedobaptist friends.

If one assumes that children of believers are within the covenant until they prove otherwise, exactly what manner of behavior from the three year old would be deemed as evidence of covenantal unfaithfulness and worthy of community discipline and possible future excommunication should they not repent? Or is there a certain age under which this does not apply and if so where would one find evidence for this? As hard as it may be for the Baptist to discern when young children may be admitted as full members of the community, it seems equally as difficult for the Paedobaptist to discern when a child's behavior shows covenant breaking, especially when the assumption is that God's promise is to their children as much as to professing parents. A subjective call is required by both Baptist and Paedobaptist parents alike.

For how long should those who understand their infants as being fully fledged members of the covenant maintain a judgement of charity when a child shows more and more evidence of lacking a new heart?

To therefore take an agnostic view in terms of the state of the young child and wait for evidence seems wise. However as we'll consider in future posts, the real debate is not over what one thinks of a childs subjective profession but rather over how one considers God's promises to Abraham and Isreal to function in the New Covenant.

Whence this blog

Because this is so important. And because although I think that there is a lot of great stuff spoken here, here and here, confessionally I'm here.